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Abstract
This paper aims at examining how democratization in post-uprising Egypt remains flawed and the 
reasons for this failure. As a background, democratization in post-Arab Spring Egypt has collapsed 
and it seems now merely an illusion. The situation worsened since Egypt’s democratically elected 
President Morsi was expelled from office through a coup, following mass protests demanding Morsi’s 
discharge. Egypt’s democratization is hard to achieve due to the shadow of the Pharaoh in Egypt, 
that is, entrenched ruling elites; Egypt’s democratization process can never succeed while Egypt’s 
old ruling elites are reluctant to allow this to happen.
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Introduction
The period after the 2011 Arab Spring toppling of Hosni Mubarak brought 
high expectations among Egyptians to rebuild Egypt as a democratic 
country. Although expectations were quite high, the military coup led 
by Abdul Fatah El-Sisi on 3 July 2013 towards Egypt’s first democratically-
elected president, Mohammad Morsi, retarded the process of democratic 
transition in Egypt.
Since then, despite seizing power, the military has installed an interim 
government led by Adly Mansour, the former head of the Egyptian 
supreme constitutional court. The military-backed interim government 
guided the country along the roadmap drafted by the military. In the 
meantime, the victory of Abdul Fatah El-Sisi in Egypt’s 2014 presidential 
election, which was backed by the military, failed to lead the nation 
through democratic transition. Under Sisi, Egyptian authorities decided 
to criminalize the Moslem Brotherhood, the oldest and most influential 
Islamist group in Egypt. In 2014, the courts decided to dissolve the Moslem 
Brotherhood’s political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) – to 
which Morsi belongs – and the party was also excluded from Egypt’s 2015 
parliamentary elections in order to prevent the rise of “extremists” (Aly 
and Essaila 2016). 
Afterwards, conditions worsened when the mass media became 
controlled by the government. Moreover, a great number of civilians 
were in detention, undergoing military trials, following the banning of civil 
society and pro-democracy organizations by the authorities, and the 
passing of several laws restricting the rights of Egyptians. 
This paper contains six sections. In the first section the paper provides an 
overview of Egypt’s democratization process prior to the 2011 Arab Spring 
in Egypt. In the second part, the paper discusses the turmoil of Egypt’s 
25 January revolution that led to the fall of Mubarak’s regime. It also 
examines the flawed democratic transition in the hands of the military 
under SCAF and the environment in which Morsi was elected as Egypt’s 
first democratically elected president. 
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While the third section examines Morsi’s administration’s policies when he 
was in power, and his missteps in building relations with the military and 
opposition, the fourth part observes the role of Egypt’s military in Morsi’s 
discharge, the election of president Abdul Fatah El-Sisi, and the military’s 
dominance over Egyptian politics and economics that is hindering the 
prospect of democratization in the country. 
The exclusion of Islamic groups and the restriction of civil society and 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) during President Sisi’s period 
are described and explained in the fifth section of this paper. The last 
and sixth section provides a deep analysis of the research question and a 
theoretical framework for understanding the problems raised.
This paper aims at presenting a brief description and analysis to explain 
the failing process of democratization in post-Arab Spring Egypt. It also 
presents a brief overview of recent events and the development of 
Egypt’s democratization during the leadership of the current president, 
Sisi. The main purpose of this paper is to find the cause of democratic 
degeneration in post-2011 Egypt, which has resulted in the Arab Spring 
to appear as an illusion. This study applies a qualitative comparative 
approach method to address the problem of the study. As will be explained 
later in the paper, a comparative approach was used to deepen and 
strengthen the hypothesis of this study, which was done through analysing 
the failed transition of recent events. Ultimately, the theories and concepts 
of democratization, democratic transition, and civil society are the most 
suitable concepts to be applied in this paper.
Literature review
In the meantime, due to an unachievable consensus over a definition 
of democracy among scholars, there are a lot of interpretations of 
democracy, resulting in different kinds, types, and conceptualization on 
what democracy actually is. 
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Larry Diamond’s Developing Democracy toward Consolidation gave 
a definition of electoral democracy, which previously was posed by 
Joseph Schumpter as a minimalist democracy. This is to say that a country 
is claimed to be a democratic one when it is at least able to address 
certain requirements such as a multi-party system and regular elections 
to assume government office. This minimalist democracy, also known as 
procedural democracy, is considered to be suitable for a country that 
has just entered the democratic transition stage (Diamond 1999: 9–10).
However, Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz argued that democracy cannot 
be merely viewed from the elements of procedural democracy such as 
elections and a multi-party system. Democracy should have a constitution 
to guarantee the basic freedoms, rights, and protections towards the 
rights of minority groups. Essentially, democracy has to be interpreted 
substantially. This means that democracy should be applied in everyday 
life and be part of the political culture that can guarantee the basic rights 
and ensure the freedoms of individuals and groups (Stepan 2000: 39). 
Regarding this substantial democracy, the Egyptian Constitutions of 
1971, 2012 and 2014 have illustrated Egypt as a democratic state. The 
constitutions clearly describe the substantial democracy that addresses 
the basic rights and freedoms of any individual. Equal opportunity, freedom 
of thought, participation of women, freedom of the press, protection 
from violence, etc. are some of rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Egyptian constitutions. It means that these constitutions have guaranteed 
human rights values and supported Islamic Shari’a in a liberal perspective 
(Lombardi and Brown 2005). Although liberalization processes in Egypt 
can be traced from the era of Anwar Sadat through various elections, a 
multiparty system, and economic development, the fulfillment of basic 
rights and freedoms has constantly been violated. The infringement of 
these rights and freedoms have become more intense during the turmoil 
since Mubarak’s resignation, the events of Morsi’s downfall, and Abdul 
Fatah El-Sisi’s coming to power. 
Jeffrey Haynes argues that the development of a democratization process 
cannot be separated from these four stages: (1) political liberalization; 
(2) the collapse of the non-democratic regime; (3) democratic transition 
and; (4) democratic consolidation (Haynes 2013: 2). In that process, after 
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the collapse of the authoritarian regime, the country has entered the 
stage of a transition process. The study of democratic transition has been 
increasingly widespread and developed especially during the third wave 
of democratization from 1974 until the 1990s when more than thirty non-
democratic countries turned to democracy (Huntington 1991: 12). 
In the case of Egypt, the downfall of Mubarak’s non-democratic regime 
put the country into a transitional period, particularly when the head 
of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), Field Marshal 
Muhammad Hussein Tantawi, led the transitional process until the next 
presidential election was held (Stein 2012: 5). Grasping the meaning of 
transition introduced by O’Donnel and Schmitter, in which they define 
transition as the interval between the fall of an authoritarian regime and 
the establishment of a new regime (whether democratic, authoritarian, 
revolutionary or hybrid) (O’Donnel et al. 1986: 6), the transitional period 
in Egypt ended when SCAF handed over power to Morsi, Egypt’s first 
democratically-elected president. 
However, the transition process is deemed to be quite a difficult and long 
process, as one of the outcomes is conflict among political parties and 
interest groups (O’Donell 1994: 60). This happens because the transition 
process is marked by an increase of public participation, political 
liberalization, enhancement of civil rights, as well as the implementation 
of democratic procedures in public spheres. Yet, each country has its 
different implementation of the transition process in accordance with 
the conditions prevailing in that country. Hence, noting the events in 
the post-Morsi era, Egypt is still completely in the process of the so-called 
democratic transition. 
Stephen J. King’s The New Authoritarian in the Middle East and North 
Africa emphasizes that authoritarianism in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) is both persistent and dynamic (King 2009: 5). He argues 
that most countries in the region began to proceed into democracy 
in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the region did not directly turn into a 
democratic one. Rather, he argues that the system invented a new model 
of authoritarianism, replacing its predecessor, ‘old authoritarianism’ (King 
2009: 31–32).
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Samuel Huntington’s Democracy’s Third Wave pointed out that the 
emergence of liberalization in some of the Middle East and African countries 
in the 1990s was the impact of the ‘snowballing’ of democratization taking 
place in other countries such as in Eastern Europe (Huntington 1991: 16). 
Michael Schulz’s The Role of Civil Society in Regional Governance in the 
Middle East, in the volume Civil Society and International Governance 
edited by David Amstrong and Valeria Bello, aims to highlight the 
development and the furtherance of civil society in the Middle East. He 
explains that the emergence of civil society in the Middle East in the 1990s 
was supposed to be the forerunner for the development of democracy in 
the region. However, the enhancement of civil society in the region is not 
as vivid as in many other regions in the world, as it is often controlled and 
movements are restricted by the state apparatus (Muhkabarat) (Schulz 
2011: 166–171).
Amy Hawtorn’s Middle Eastern Democracy: Is Civil Society the Answer 
stresses that in many Arab countries, the growing number of civil society 
organizations do not lead the country to democratization. State repression 
has become the main challenge, limiting the space and activities of civil 
society. The durable authoritarianism in the region has weakened the role 
of civil society (Hawthorne 2004: 10). Meanwhile, the role of civil society 
is significant to the country as it reinforces democracy through public 
scrutiny (Nanz and Steffek 2004: 324). 
Many believe that the upheaval that surged in most Middle Eastern 
countries in late 2010 was the path for the region to be able to open 
up to democratization. In his book Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving 
Ruling Bargain in the Middle East, Mehran Kamrava offers an analysis 
that durable authoritarianism in the Middle East was maintained by the 
ruling bargain in which the government guarantees the prosperity of the 
people. Instead, the ruling autocrats could only maintain their durable 
authoritarianism by banning political parties and taking control of civil 
society, NGOs, and trade unions (Kamrava 2014: 20).
Kamrava then mentions the rise and fall of the ruling bargain which also 
became the cause of the emergence of the Arab Uprisings in 2011. He 
points out two advancements behind the upheavals in the region. The 
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first significant factor is the ease in getting information on other events in 
the region, which relates to the enhancement of education and the rapid 
emergence of both traditional and new media in the region. Second, the 
states that were affected by the unfolding crisis had a dynamic response 
(Kamrava 2014: 39).
Departing from this point, it is clear that the new media (social media) has 
had a great impact in advancing information to the region. Facebook 
and Twitter are the tools which made a contagion effect, starting from the 
Tunisian revolution, to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, and eventually 
becoming more dynamic. Hand in hand with Kamrava, Lachen Achy 
(Achy 2012) argues that the inability of these Middle Eastern rulers to 
maintain their authoritarian bargain is affected by several factors, namely 
economy, demography, and education. 
In Egypt, though Mubarak’s overthrow has moved the country into a 
democratic transitional stage, the transition and democratic process 
in Egypt remain uncertain. Even after the victory of Morsi in Egypt’s first 
democratic elections in 2013, the insurgency in Egyptian political, social, 
and economic spheres were undeniable. No matter how much the 
Egyptian democratic movements insisted on turning the country into a 
democratic one, the authoritarians’ tone still remains strong in Egypt’s 
democratization process.
One of the factors hindering the democratization process is the military. 
The roles of Egypt’s military in dominating the everyday life of Egypt’s 
people have been beyond doubt for decades. Amos Perlmutter, in 
Egypt, The Praetorian State, argues that Egypt is a praetorian state where 
the potential for the state to be dominated by the military remains high. 
He argues that in countries where civil governments fail to legitimate 
themselves, the military appears and intervenes in civilian affairs and 
often dominates them (Perlmutter 1974: 4–5). He still argues that mostly, 
praetorian elements exist in developing and underdeveloped countries, 
where the executive body is ineffective and compounded by political 
decay. In addition, when the authoritarian regime falls, the army tends to 
intervene in the transition process as the political sphere is stuck in a fragile 
condition (Perlmutter 1977: 18).
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Hand in hand with Perlmutter, Samuel Huntington, in Political Order 
and Changing Societies, argues that military involvement is not only 
based on military affairs but also for political purposes. Thus, these so-
called praetorian measures are not only undertaken by the military but 
also by social forces that are highly politicized and influenced by the 
military. This is what Huntington calls a praetorian society; further, such 
mobilization along the interests of the military would worsen already 
weak government institutions and their ability to articulate public interest 
(Huntington 2006: 195–196).
In the case of Egypt, although the military dominates Egypt’s structural, 
institutional and even constitutional spheres, but we cannot say that 
Egypt is totally ruled by the military, like the military Junta in Myanmar. 
Unfortunately, still, the military’s ascendancy goes hand-in-hand with 
the prolonged existence of authoritarianism in Egypt, along with the 
ruling elites, the so-called “deep state”, which indeed cannot be 
seen except in an abstract way. These types of military roles have 
maintained the endurance of the authoritarian regime and hindered 
the process of democratization in Egypt.
As Georg Sørensen points out, the success of a democratic transition 
process cannot be separated from the interference of elite groups 
(military, economic, and political elites) in order to protect their 
interests. In most cases, these countries have democratic elements 
but transition is limited in its completion. Public participation and 
freedom, which are the foundations of building political democracy, 
are limited. This kind of democracy is called by Sørensen a restricted 
democracy (Sørensen 2008: 46–49). This kind of democracy was 
used by the Mubarak regime to maintain its power over 34 years, an 
authoritarianism hidden behind democratic ideas. 
These kinds of concepts are used in explaining the developments, and 
reversals, of Egypt’s democratic process.
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Egypt’s democratic experience 
Egypt’s democratic experience started once the country gained 
independence from British occupation in 1922. It can be seen through 
the implementation of the 1923 constitution in which a parliamentary 
democratic system was established, allowing civilians to have greater 
liberty (Dunne and Hamzawy 2008: 18). However, liberalization could 
not help Egypt escape from economic and social problems, since 
the influences of British colonialism remained for the next thirty years. 
This situation eventually led to a coup conducted by the Free Officer 
Movement against the monarchy regime in 1952. Since then, Egypt has 
been led by autocrats with a military background (Hassan 2010: 320).
In Gamal Abdul Nasser’s years in power, the development of 
democratization was challenged by some of Nasser’s policies, restricting 
the development of basic democratic elements. Nasser then abolished 
political pluralism that had been developed in the previous monarchic 
era, by imposing a one-party political system with the dissolution of 
parliament and banning the existence of opposition groups, both Islamist 
and leftist. Indirectly, the policy had given Nasser all executive power and 
made him Egypt’s greatest power holder (Selim 2015: 30–31).
This condition is compatible with the idea of Mehran Kamrava’s assertion 
of the use of an authoritarian bargain by Nasser, in his populist days 
between 1950s-1960s, in order to forward his political interests. In such a 
condition, his power was strengthened and coloured by these political 
patterns (Kamrava 2014: 20). 
Following Nasser’s death, his successor, Anwar Sadat, marked a turning 
point, transforming Egypt’s political, economic, and foreign policies 
towards political and economic liberalization that was opposite to 
Nasser’s socialism (Hassan 2010: 321). One of Sadat’s liberalization 
policies, The Infitah (open-door) was introduced in order to enhance 
foreign investment. Thus, economic liberalization is closely related to the 
shift of Egypt’s foreign policy from Russia under Nasser, to the west, which 
in this case is America, under Sadat (Baker 1981: 378). The decision to 
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turn from the east to the west forced Egypt to re-consider its openness to 
democratization, since America embraced the democratic agenda. In 
this way, as a form of acceptance to the American side, economic and 
political liberalization became priority matters in Sadat’s years in power. 
In order to enhance political liberalization, Sadat attempted to introduce 
a multiparty system. It was marked by the publication of Law 40/1977, in 
which five political parties were established. The Social Liberalist Party stood 
for the right, the National Progressive Party represented the left, the Socialist 
Labor Party, New Wafd Party and the centrist Egypt Arab Socialist Party, 
which afterwards Sadat changed to the National Democratic Party (NDP) 
were directed by Sadat himself (Selim 2015: 32). However, Sadat’s rule was 
not so different from his predecessor Nasser, as he decided to diminish 
the role of the opposition, individual parties and the media by releasing a 
number of decrees of restriction and repression (Selim 2015: 33). 
The reasons for this political shift were that, at the outset of his power, Sadat 
needed the political legitimacy and support from the Egyptian people, 
in coping with any domestic issues regarding political instability (Barnett 
and Levy 1991: 379). He would change his image from an authoritarian, 
to democratic leader, although he realized that it was not easy. In fact, 
he indeed had to tackle serious problems regarding Egypt’s economic 
condition and security, leading him back to behaving similarly to Nasser 
as an authoritarian leader.
Despite the liberalizations receiving a positive reception, mainly from the 
west, the consequences to Egyptian’s domestic conditions were quite 
severe. The reduction of subsidies on basic commodities resulted in the 
appearance of massive demonstrations and riots in Egyptian cities in 
early 1977. Thus, government policies to reduce subsidies were to show 
financial responsibility to major aid agencies and foreign investors from 
wealthy donor countries like the USA, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The mass 
protests resulted in casualties, with 79 people killed, 1000 wounded and 
1250 jailed (Baker 1981: 381). 
Anwar Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, implemented policies aimed 
to restore stability. Mubarak released political prisoners and called for 
national reconciliation among political opponents. He then increased 
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press freedoms and allowed the establishment of political parties, which 
led to the presence of 24 political parties during Mubarak’s ruling years 
(Selim 2015: 34).
However, although there were several elements of electoral democracy 
found in his leadership, through legislative and presidential elections, 
Mubarak’s fifth victory in Egypt’s presidential elections cannot be 
separated from suppression towards opposition groups, judges, journalists, 
and the Moslem Brotherhood, who all challenged the continuity of his 
power (Arafat 2011: 20–151). In his book, Arafat mentioned some factors 
hindering democratic transition during Mubarak’s rule, such as weak 
opposition parties and civil society, the difficulty of concluding a peaceful 
transition, rampant corruption, de-liberalization policies, and the threat of 
retribution (Arafat 2011: 137–153).
The depiction of Mubarak’s electoral democracy was the picture of 
authoritarianism in the age of democratization. In a sense, in the midst of 
the demands of the people as well as huge international pressure for the 
country to move closer towards democracy, the authoritarian regime in 
Egypt used the electoral system as a shield, branding the country as one 
in the consolidation process of democratization, even though the reality 
was quite different (Brownlee 2007: 2)
The aforementioned policies were depicted by Larry Diamond as pseudo 
democracy, in which the existence of a non-democratic regime is 
covered by formal democratic elements such as elections and a multi-
party system (Diamond 1999: 17). In the case of Egypt, the ruling party, 
NDP, maintained its hegemony in most of Egypt’s parliamentary elections. 
Thus, the tactics of the NDP and Mubarak cannot be separated from 
repression, patronage, and media control by the Mubarak regime.
Post-Egypt uprising: flawed transition
The wave of democratization, also known as Arab Spring, surged through 
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the Arab world in the last quarter of 2010, leading to mass protests 
demanding the downfall of various authoritarian regimes in the region. 
Egypt was no exception, experiencing severe protests after being 
controlled by Hosni Mubarak for 30 years (Nassif 2013).
The major reason why this large-scale mass-protest took to the streets 
demanding the autocrat’s downfall, is due to the rupture of the ruling 
bargain between the regime and the people. In recent decades, the 
durable autocrats in the Arab world proffer social services to the people 
in lieu of minimizing the role of citizens in the decision making-process 
(Yahya 2017: 3)
In Egypt, the protests demanding the ouster of Hosni Mubarak showed 
the fury of the people as Mubarak failed to preserve the ruling bargain 
he had maintained for decades. The flawed authoritarian bargain in 
Arab States, and particularly in Egypt, was due to the inability of these 
autocratic regimes to cope with demographic growth, a youth bulge, and 
unemployment over the past decades. The situation was also worsened 
by the ruler’s combining of repression, economic benefits, and political 
concessions (Achy 2012). 
The key elements of the revolution, such as youth, social media, activism, 
civil society, and NGOs, were consolidating their power to ouster the 
last ‘Pharaoh of Egypt’. It can be assumed that the repression and the 
reluctance of the regime to embrace human rights and democracy 
had become the main reason for Egyptians to reveal their prolonged 
frustration, after 34 years of Mubarak’s authoritarianism. In the midst of 
massive protests and the spontaneous military decision to side with the 
people, Mubarak then resigned from his office in February 2011. Mubarak’s 
resignation had brought a huge expectation in the hearts of Egyptians to 
turn the country from authoritarianism to democracy (El-Sherif 2014: 3).
In the post-Mubarak period, the higher military council, Supreme Council 
of the Armed Forces (SCAF), held power during the transition period, after 
suspending the 1971 constitution and dissolving parliament. SCAF held a 
referendum and assured the freedom of the media and the youth, as well 
as paved the way for the legislative and presidential elections that took 
place afterwards (Kuncahyono 2013). 
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For the first time, the people and the military seemed to be allied. The 
slogan “the army and the people are one hand” depicted the intimacy of 
these two allies. Moreover, in the months following Mubarak’s ouster, the 
SCAF had promised to ensure the freedom of the media, youth and NGOs. 
However, in the following days, in the midst of political indeterminacy, as 
well as the postponement of a legislative election that was supposed to 
be held around six months after Mubarak’s resignation, the people were 
frightened by ongoing military domination (McCormick 2011). 
As a result, the rate of various mass protests and demonstrations significantly 
increased, and according to data from Amnesty International, SCAF 
took repressive measures against the media and civil society groups 
whose positions differed with SCAF’s. In addition, various violations, 
including virginity tests held by the military towards women protesters in 
Tahrir Square, had insulted and harassed the rights of Egyptian women 
specifically (Mannheimer 2014: 18). Furthermore, the enactment of a state 
of emergency, as well as the military tribunals that tried civilians, which 
have existed since the Mubarak era, were considered to undermine the 
democratic expectations of the Egyptians. Ever since this period, the 
proximity of these two allies has been damaged. 
From this flawed transition, the public wondered about the meaning 
of the January 25 revolution for the interests of the people. Indeed, the 
transition is producing a different level of achievement when compared 
to the Tunisian Uprising. The democratization process in Tunisia has been 
relatively more successful because of the smaller political role and 
intervention of the military.
In Tunisia, the military seems reluctant to be deeply involved in political 
affairs in the Tunisian transitional process. Zine El Abidine Bin Ali tried 
to dissociate the armed forces from political and economic affairs 
(Mannheimer 2014: 19). It was totally different in Egypt, where the military 
has played many roles in the transition and in fact dominated Egypt’s 
economy ever since Nasser was in power. 
In the case of Egypt, from the beginning of Mubarak’s ouster, Egyptians 
have lost their opportunity to turn the country into a democratic one, due 
to the intervention of the military. However, it was not the people who 
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chose the military to implement Egypt’s transition. It was Mubarak who 
handed power to the SCAF, and the people had forgotten for a while 
that the military was part of Mubarak’s legacy. At first, the people seemed 
glad and did not recognize SCAF’s motives to maintain power. Moreover, 
the Egyptian military has had longstanding influence in protecting the 
country. But then, the broken promises by SCAF has made the people 
realize that they had ignored the worst things when the military comes to 
power - that it would be difficult for them to withdraw.
In the final quarter of 2011, which popularized the slogan “Down! Down 
with military rule”, SCAF then held an election, both legislative and 
presidential. The Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the party affiliated with 
the Ikhwanul Muslimin (Moslem Brotherhood) won the largest number of 
seats in both the upper and lower houses of parliament. In the presidential 
election that was held afterwards, Mohammad Morsi, the FJP candidate, 
claimed victory over Hosni Mubarak’s Prime Minister, Ahmed Shafiq, and 
was declared Egypt’s first democratically-elected president (Kuncahyono 
2013: 204) 
Egypt under Morsi: losing an opportunity
The victory of Morsi marked the first successful democratic transition in 
post-Arab Spring Egypt. Though he gained the presidency, Morsi still faced 
various economic, political and social problems left by the Mubarak 
regime. In the post-Mubarak era, Morsi was not only confronted by the 
demands of the people, but also had to deal with and build relations 
with Mubarak’s remnants, called the deep state, that had been deeply 
rooted in Egypt’s political, economy and social sphere. 
While all parties anticipated the success of a democratic transition in Egypt, 
this has not emerged as easily as imagined. Since the very beginning, 
when Morsi came to power, the political polarization among Egyptian 
elites was noticeable and became one of the main challenges of Morsi’s 
policy. Secular groups who felt betrayed by the military and the Moslem 
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Brotherhood combined forces and formed an opposition group, the 
National Salvation Front (NSF), which later became Morsi’s main political 
opposition in the country. The NSF boycotted Morsi’s referendum on the 
draft constitution, held in late December 2012, arguing that the new 
constitutional draft was only benefiting Islamist party groups, dominated 
by the Moslem Brotherhood (Gerbaudo 2013).
Since then, the state has seen further divisions and polarizations which have 
ruined the democratic transition process. Consequently, those divisions 
have complicated Egypt’s political decision making process. When one 
side of the party feels disadvantaged by a policy made by the other 
side, the deep rupture among the polarized parties cannot be avoided. 
The peak of public outrage happened during Morsi’s 22 November 
constitutional decrees that granted him extensive powers, beyond the 
control of Egypt’s courts. Those controversial decrees were considered by 
many in the opposition as the resurgence of a new Pharaoh (Gerbaudo 
2013). 
After Mubarak, the economic factors behind Mubarak’s downfall caused 
greater devastation to the transitional process. These unresolved economic 
problems were worsened during Morsi’s years in power. The high prices of 
basic foods, high rates of unemployment, and electricity and oil crises 
triggered more complaints and political instability. The percentage of the 
population living in poverty increased from 25.2% in 2010/2012, to 26.3% 
in 2012/2013, and the state debt increased from US $5 billion/year up to 
$8 billion/year a few days after the coup. Loans from the IMF and other 
sources of funds still cannot fix these problems (Farid 2014).
In Egypt, the Islamist party was unable to deal with political factions, in 
contrast with the Tunisian Ennahda Islamist party, which also won the first 
election in post-Ben Ali Tunisia. The very first time the Ennahda party was 
in charge, it managed to share power with various factions and created 
political partnerships with moderate secularist and moderate Islamist 
groups (Ghannouchi 2014).
Morsi failed to deal with the opposition, a failure compounded by his 
policies which tried to minimize the role of the military. The cases above 
have led to the emergence of anti-Morsi demonstrations, namely 
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tamarrod which later led to the coup conducted by the Egyptian military 
(Mannheimer 2014: 17).
When the military decided to remove Morsi from power, Egypt lost the 
opportunity to build a democratic institution in the post-SCAF transition 
era. It seems difficult to describe what kind of democratic character 
Egypt has, if its first democratically-elected president was ousted not less 
than a year after he came to power.
Egyptian democracy: dependent on the military 
The development of Egypt’s democratization cannot be separated from 
the massive influence of the military since the fall of the monarchy in 
1952. Since then, Egypt has been dominated by military autocrats and 
by a president who came from a military background until the downfall 
of Mubarak in 2011. In the Nasser era, Egypt was depicted as a military 
society. In such a political culture, the involvement of the military inside 
Egypt’s political administration in the era of Nasser happened easily. 
Beyond that, Nasser also entangled the military in many countries with 
giant economic projects. 
In the era of Sadat, despite the de-politicization of the military started by 
Sadat, the military still had many privileges and built the military-economic 
empire. It is estimated that around 40% of the total Egyptian economy 
came from business companies controlled by the military. It was also 
supported by $1.3 billion in US military assistance annually since Sadat 
signed the Camp David accords in 1979 (Pappalarado 2011).
The position of the military grew stronger under Mubarak’s regime. The 
military was granted many privileges, not only in the political, but also in 
the economic sphere (Sayigh 2012: 84). Since then, the military has built 
what Trias Kuncahyono expressed as “a state within a state”, that has 
great impact on economic and social structures in Egypt (Kuncahyono 
2013: 208).
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In the midst of deepened polarization and division with the mass protests 
demanding Morsi’s resignation, military aircraft flew over the crowds and 
dropped the Egyptian flag, denoting that the military had decided to take 
the people’s side. The anniversary of Mubarak’s resignation on 30 June 
2012 served as the culmination of protests towards Morsi’s government. 
On the next day, General Abdul Fatah El-Sisi came on public television 
and announced a 48-hour ultimatum to Morsi, to take an immediate 
decision on Egypt’s politics (Fisher 2013).
Morsi ignored El-Sisi’s ultimatum, which forced the military to stage a 
coup against him and develop the roadmap for Egypt’s future. After 
suspending the 2012 Egyptian constitution, the military then appointed 
Adly Mansour, the head of the Egyptian Supreme Court, to become an 
interim president, and formed a cabinet mostly consisting of Mubarak’s 
remnants and retired military generals (El-Adawy 2013).
The military has enormous power in building Egypt’s democratization 
process. It can be said that the success of Egypt’s democratic transition is 
decided by the military. When Abdul Fatah El-Sisi gained a massive victory 
in the 2014 presidential election, the prospect of Egypt’s democratization 
process was questioned. El-Sisi, who is backed by the military and its allies 
that were also behind the downfall of Morsi, increasingly indicated that 
the country was still under the shadow of the old ruling elites. 
The shadow of the old regime has led to a flawed process of democratic 
transition in post-Arab Spring Egypt. It can be said that the repressive 
measures used by the SCAF, and the military coup towards Morsi, have 
depicted Egypt taking a hard-line approach to the country’s ongoing 
transitional process. As noted by O’Donnell and Schmitter, the use of 
hard-line and soft-line approaches within the political elite have a large 
influence on the democratic transition process (O’Donnell et al. 1991). The 
soft-line approach makes it easy to facilitate, negotiate and compromise 
between split factions. In contrast, the use of a hard-line approach shows 
a country is reluctant to use diplomatic processes in implementing its 
transition process. 
Alongside the use of a hard-line approach rather than a soft-line one, the 
military and the ruling elites or the old guards, still maintain their position 
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in the hearts of the Egyptians. This is not only because the military 
has a long-standing history in protecting the country, but also due to 
the anti-Morsi protesters who had lost hope in an Islamist President’s 
leadership. They also feared Ikhwanization that would Islamize the 
country in the same way as Iran after the 1979 Iranian revolutions. These 
were compounded with the support of the opposition groups and 
the United States, who has enjoyed long relations with the Egyptian 
military (Al-Amin 2013).
In accordance with the statement of Perlmutter as previously 
mentioned, the praetorian military appears and survives in a country 
where their institutions are weak and fragile or is still in the transitional 
process. Taking into account the fact that Egypt’s military has deep 
connections in politics and the economy, and has tightened their 
relationships with the external actors, along with Egyptian ruling elites, 
it is clear that the success of transition and the democratic process is 
all in the hands of Egypt’s military.
The question emerges: how could the military’s role endure and 
maintain durable autocrats in Egypt, even after the country 
succeeded in toppling Mubarak and Morsi. Even the new President 
Sisi has insisted that the country has turned into a democratic one. In 
fact, ever since Egypt’s first republic was formed, the ruling elites that 
mostly come from the military, are reluctant to turn the country into 
a democracy. As Egypt’s major power holder, they would never let 
a civilian with no military background control them. Therefore, in the 
midst of international demands for a democratic system, they tend to 
let democracy arise by diminishing the role of dictatorial leaders and 
installing many characteristics of a democratic system. In fact, they 
construct scenarios to keep their power in place, much like how the 
military staged a coup of Morsi’s government. Therefore, even when 
the dictatorial leaders have been overthrown, the military’s power 
and interests are still in place, and governments with military backing 
remain.
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The exclusion of islamists
After the military staged a coup of Egypt’s first democratically elected 
President, Morsi, there was strong resistance from Morsi’s Islamist 
supporters, who assumed that military actions were not legitimate. Morsi’s 
supporters undertook massive protests and demonstrations, demanding 
the restoration of Morsi’s power as Egypt’s president. Instead of receiving 
a positive response from Egyptian authorities, these groups suffered 
repression from security forces, both military and police. 
The clashes between the security forces and Morsi’s supporters heated up 
when Adly Mansour declared a state of emergency, which was applied 
during Mubarak’s years in power. The declaration of a state of emergency 
was applied following the sit-in and mass protest of Morsi’s supporters, 
demanding the restoration of Morsi (Bassiouni 2013: 1–4).
A thousand rallies held by Morsi supporters took place in two main 
locations, Raba’a Al-Adawiya and An-Nahda Square Cairo. The security 
forces moved directly to both locations without giving any notice or 
opportunity for protesters to leave the location peacefully. Those repressive 
actions were met with provocative actions by the demonstrators, making 
casualties inevitable. More than 300 people died and 1000 others were 
injured during the protest that occurred on 14 August 2013 (Bassiouni 
2013: 4).
The media, with great influence in shaping public opinion on the recent 
events, has been polarized since Morsi came to power. Media such 
as Aljazeera Egypt, Misr25, Al-Hafiz, Ar-Rahma and An-Nas, which are 
considered to be sympathetic to the Moslem Brotherhood, were banned 
from broadcasting (Radsch 2013).
The intensity of societal polarization increased when Egypt’s High 
Court announced the banning of the largest Islamic movement, the 
Moslem Brotherhood, and labelled the group as a terrorist organization. 
Brotherhood members and leaders were arrested and their assets were 
frozen. Moreover, their affiliated political party, the Freedom and Justice 
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Party (FJP) was dissolved by the court and could not participate in 
legislative elections (El-Dine 2014: 3).
The decisions of El-Sisi’s authorities in excluding the Moslem Brotherhood 
from Egypt’s political arena was feared to be the same experience as 
Algeria back in 1992, when the military there boycotted the electoral 
victory of the Islamist party, the Islamic Salvation Front (ISF), in Algeria in 
1991. The Algerian military then suspended the constitution, forced the 
president from power and took over the transitional government. The 
Algerian Islamic groups that had been repressed and persecuted turned 
to the extremist groups and performed terrors that led to a prolonged 
Algerian conflict (Zaretsky 2013).
The Algerian bad experience was feared to be reoccurring in Egypt when 
Sisi’s authority excluded the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt’s domestic 
political sphere. The deepening polarization of and discrimination towards 
marginalized Islamist groups, has resulted in a prolonged conflict that is 
hindering the future prospects of Egypt’s democratization. 
Why has the recent transition failed? 
In his short speech before members of Egypt’s newest parliament in the 
first quarter of 2016, President Abdul Fatah El-Sisi revealed that Egypt has 
successfully passed the transition phase and has established a democracy. 
The president also claimed that the country has rebuilt the foundations of 
democratic elements such as institutional and constitutional law (The New 
Arab 2016). Egypt itself has been without a parliament since its dissolution 
in 2012. 
Has the Egyptian transition to democracy been successfully achieved, 
despite the government’s massive repression?
Previously, in the period of the post-Morsi era, when Egypt was managed 
by the military-backed interim government in the absence of parliament, 
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and in the face of civil unrest, Mansour issued a number of laws that have 
curtailed the liberty of civilians. The protest law, released in November 
2013, regulates a set of regulations for forming an association and a set 
of regulations to be followed when holding protests and demonstrations. 
It also stipulates the number of people and places allowed to hold such 
events (Brown 2014).
In addition to the protest law, there are university regulations issued by the 
Supreme Council of the Universities, one of the bodies under the Ministry 
of Higher Education of Egypt, allowing interdiction and prohibition of 
demonstrations and associations related to political parties (Brown 2014).
If we look at the prospect of stability and democratization in Egypt, Egypt 
still has a long way to achieve real democracy. In the era of Sisi, the 
number of detained, tortured, and arrested journalists has significantly 
increased. The suppression of opposition groups has been carried out by 
the issuance of various laws restricting the people’s freedom of expression. 
The oppression to the Moslem Brotherhood and the labelling of the FJP as 
a terrorist group were forms of suppression of Islamist groups in Egypt.
In the third quarter of 2015, Sisi approved additional drafting of anti-
terrorism laws, stipulating that terrorism is the act of violence, intimidation, 
and threats addressed to the government and civilians in public, that 
threatens the security of the country. In this case, the journalist and reporter 
who incite and spread false news regarding the government, the military 
forces, and the police are included as terrorists and are sanctioned in 
accordance to existing laws (Sirgany 2015)
Yet, in fact, the arrest and detainment of journalists by the military and 
police was commonly known in the post-Morsi era. As noticed by Alfred 
Stepan, democracy cannot be interpreted solely through electoral 
democracy, especially when the electoral system seems far from fair 
and free. In the post-Mubarak period, Egypt indeed had elements of 
substantive democracy, such as civil society, civil liberties, media, and 
NGOs. But while still in development, these nascent elements were 
challenged and restricted during Sisi’s rule. This was worsened by the 
exclusion of the Moslem Brotherhood from Egypt’s political landscape, 
indicating that the government marginalized one particular group that 
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was perceived to have ruined the ongoing transition process.
The report shows that Egypt is not free, which is proven by a lack of 
freedom of speech as one of the fundamental rights of citizens. Moreover, 
most of the magazines and televisions belong to the government limiting 
the publication of independent media (Mohammadpour 2016: 147-153).
In the period after Morsi, the detainment of local and foreign journalists 
increased significantly, with 25 journalists in custody until December 2016. 
This makes Egypt the second largest country in the world regarding the 
number of journalist prisoners, preceded only by China with 38 journalist 
prisoners (Committee to Protect Journalists 2016).
The latest Global Terrorism Index report highlights that the country’s global 
terrorism index has significantly increased. Egypt ranks 13th out of 162 
countries on the global terrorism index. Acts of terrorism in Egypt increased 
in 2015 and 2016 when the country jumped to 9th rank with the death toll 
reaching 662 until 2016 (Terrorism Index 2016).
Consequently, security threats have harmed the country’s stability. 
According to the latest report from Aljazeera, the escalation of terrorist 
attacks has significantly increased in Egypt since Morsi’s overthrow in 
2013. The violent attacks were mainly located in the Sinai Peninsula (Al 
Jazeera 2016). 
From 2013 to 2016, 60,000 Egyptians and foreigners have been arrested 
by security forces (Reiter 2016). Local human rights organizations reported 
that there were 326 extrajudicial killings committed by security and 
intelligence agencies in 2015. The number increased to 754 cases by mid-
2016 (Hamzawy 2017: 20)
Up to June 2016, the Sisi administration had imposed 218 of a total of 554 
travel bans in Egypt since 2011. The report from the Association of Freedom 
of Thought and Expression (AFTE) states that the majority of individuals 
banned from entering the country were researchers and academics, 
whose research generally criticize Sisi’s administration (Magid 2016).
Article 89 of the law regarding the establishment and role of NGOs, 
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restricted the activities of NGOs and was passed by the Egyptian 
parliament in November 2016. Previously, in October 2016, the local courts 
approved the freeze of assets of 5 human rights activists and 3 NGOs 
accused of receiving financial aid from abroad, which were believed to 
be threatening security and national stability (Najjar 2017). 
As Michael Schulz and Larry Diamond previously argued, civil society has 
an imperative role in transition processes, as they act as forerunners for 
the improvement of democratization in the Middle East. In Egypt, while 
Mubarak and his predecessor maintained the ruling bargain with the 
people, in return for restricting the role of civil society, Sisi’s administration 
took the same path as his predecessor in diminishing its role. Yet, it is still not 
clear how Sisi could maintain the bargain with the people in the midst of 
upheaval and disunion after Morsi’s ouster. This is why democratization in 
Tunisia is much better than in Egypt. As in Tunisia, post-Ben Ali’s resignation, 
civil society played a massive role in keeping an eye on the government’s 
activities. 
In Egypt’s 1971 constitution, the country was portrayed as democratic, 
in return for holding both legislative and presidential elections, along 
with periodic referenda since 1950. Yet, this was no more than a pseudo-
democracy filled with government manipulation (Winter 2015: 9). It 
seems like this pseudo-democracy still runs in Egypt today. Claiming 
that the country had completed democratic transition, it was obvious 
that President Sisi wanted to get recognition from the world, despite the 
tumultuous events, restrictions, and regulations limiting Egyptians from 
speaking or acting freely during his regime. 
It seems like the Pharaohs still cast a shadow over Egyptians every day, in 
order to maintain their power and interest. When the Islamist Morsi won 
the 2012 presidential election, they feared that Morsi would diminish their 
power and turn the country into an Islamic state. Therefore, they had to 
use any and all measures in order to maintain their interests and power. 
These measures were depicted previously, in the section explaining the 
coup against Morsi.
In this democratic era where non-democratic countries are marginalized 
and face many international pressures to turn to democracy, Sisi’s 
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authority insisted that Egypt has completely upheld both the procedural 
and electoral elements of democracy. But in reality, it is part of his tactic 
to upgrade autocracy in Egypt by diminishing the elements upgrading 
democracy, civil society, media freedoms, NGOs, and journalists.
It has been seven years since Mubarak’s dismissal from power, and three 
years since the first democratically elected president’s ouster by the 
military. At the beginning, Sisi’s presidency established various policies 
in order to stabilize the country. In the midst of cleavages between 
the Islamists, secularists, and military forces, it seemed difficult for Sisi to 
maintain the ruling bargain that could gratify all these divided groups. 
With the military forces persistently showing praetorian characteristics, 
it would be hard for a civilian president with no military background to 
endure a presidential term. If President Sisi persists in diminishing the role 
of civil society and NGOs, excluding the Moslem Brotherhood, arresting 
and detaining journalists and subjecting people to military trials, all the 
prospects of democratization in Egypt will only be an illusion. 
Conclusion
The recent transition failed due to the shadow of Egypt’s previous regime 
hindering the transitional and democratization process. The situation was 
worsened by military supremacy over the political sphere, most obviously 
seen through the military coup which toppled Mohammad Morsi from 
power. Morsi’s ouster through the coup shows the flaws in the transitional 
process being formed since Mubarak’s downfall. 
Many believe that the recent situation in Egypt is worse than compared to 
the Mubarak era. The restriction of journalism and media, the military trials 
of civilians, tortures and detentions by the armed forces, and the control 
of civil society and NGOs prove that the current regime is not different 
from its predecessor prior to the Arab Spring in 2011. 
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In sum, the success of Egypt’s democratization in post-Arab Spring Egypt 
is an illusion as long as the country’s current ruling elites, military forces, 
judiciary, and Mubarak remnants insist on maintaining their longstanding 
authoritarian tendencies in domestic affairs. The reluctance of these 
actors to move the country towards democratic consolidation has left 
all the Egyptians’ efforts and struggles in establishing and preserving 
democracy in vain.
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